Ο Ερντογάν πάλιν πάλι στην Τουρκία
Coup ή
Όχι, ο ERDOGAN ΕΙΝΑΙ ΕΝΑΝΤΙ Ο ΑΝΤΙΠΡΟΣΩΠΟΣ ΝΙΚΗΤΗΣ ΣΤΗΝ ΤΟΥΡΚΙΑ
ΚΟΥΤΙ ΤΟΥ ΜΠΑΡΑΤ
Τα μηνύματα ηλεκτρονικού ταχυδρομείου εκτείνονται δεκαέξι χρόνια από τον Απρίλιο του 2000 έως τις 23 Σεπτεμβρίου του τρέχοντος έτους (συμπεριλαμβανομένου του πραξικοπήματος της 15ης Ιουλίου) και είναι ως επί το πλείστον αλληλογραφία μεταξύ του Albayrak και της κυρίαρχης τουρκικής ελίτ: πολιτικοί, επιχειρηματίες και μέλη της οικογένειας. Τα μηνύματα αποκαλύπτουν την εκτεταμένη επιρροή που έχει το Albayrak σε ένα ευρύ φάσμα τομέων τουρκικής πολιτικής και ζωής.
Στις 23 Σεπτεμβρίου, η Redhack, ομάδα τουρκικής hacktivist, ανακοίνωσε ότι έλαβε τα ηλεκτρονικά μηνύματα του Albayrak και θα τις απελευθέρωσε στις 26 Σεπτεμβρίου, εκτός αν η κυβέρνηση απελευθέρωσε τους αριστερών αριστερών, ονομάζοντας ειδικά τον Aslı Erdoğan (χωρίς σχέση) και τους Alp Altınörs ( βοηθοί συμπρόεδροι του Halkların Η δημοκρατική παράταξη (HDP) συνελήφθη στις 16 Σεπτεμβρίου ). Όταν δεν έγινε τίποτα, ο Redhack έβαλε το αρχείο στο Google Drive και το Dropbox. Η τουρκική κυβέρνηση, στη συνέχεια, λογοκρίνει την κανονική πρόσβαση στο Διαδίκτυο στο Google Drive, το Dropbox, το Microsoft Cloud και το Github και συνέλαβε διάφορους υποτιθέμενους υπόπτους του Redhack. Το ρεπορτάζ σε αυτό το πολύτιμο αρχείο έχει παρεμποδιστεί προηγουμένως από τη λογοκρισία και την έλλειψη ενός αξιόπιστου, αξιόπιστου, αξιόπιστου αρχείου.
Τα ηλεκτρονικά ταχυδρομεία περιγράφουν λεπτομερώς τη συμμετοχή του Albayrak σε οργανισμούς όπως η Powertrans, η οποία εμπλέκεται στις εισαγωγές πετρελαίου ISIS. Στις 11 Νοεμβρίου 2011, η κυβέρνηση Erdoğan ψήφισε νομοσχέδιο που απαγορεύει όλες τις εισαγωγές, εξαγωγές ή μεταφορές πετρελαίου ή υποπροϊόντων προς και από την Τουρκία. Αλλά το νομοσχέδιο ανέφερε επίσης ότι η κυβέρνηση θα μπορούσε να ανακαλέσει την απαγόρευση σε συγκεκριμένες περιπτώσεις. Η εξαίρεση αυτή χρησιμοποιήθηκε για να χορηγηθεί στην Powertrans τα μόνα δικαιώματα για τη μεταφορά πετρελαίου χωρίς να διεξαχθεί δημόσιος διαγωνισμός. Υπήρξαν πολυάριθμοι ισχυρισμοί στα τουρκικά μέσα ενημέρωσης σχετικά με τις εισαγωγές ελεγχόμενου πετρελαίου από την Powertrans στην Τουρκία. Ο Albayrak έχει επανειλημμένα αρνηθεί τη σύνδεσή του με την Powertrans, αλλά τα μηνύματα ηλεκτρονικού ταχυδρομείου αποδεικνύουν το αντίθετο.
Σε ένα μήνυμα ηλεκτρονικού ταχυδρομείου, ο Albayrak συζητά με τον δικηγόρο του δημόσια απορρίπτοντας οποιαδήποτε σχέση με την Powertrans. Ο δικηγόρος προτείνει μια δήλωση λέγοντας ότι "ο πελάτης μου δεν έχει πλέον δεσμούς με την Powertrans ...". Ο Αλμπαγιάκ "διορθώνει" τον, λέγοντας "τι δεν εννοείς πια; Ποτέ δεν είχα δεσμούς με αυτή την εταιρεία! " . Ωστόσο, σε όλο το αρχείο είναι σαφές ότι ο Albayrak άρχισε να συμμετέχει στην Powertrans το 2012, συμπίπτοντας με την απόφαση της κυβέρνησης να δώσει στην Powertrans τα δικαιώματα μεταφοράς πετρελαίου. Το αρχείο περιέχει σχεδόν 30 μηνύματα ηλεκτρονικού ταχυδρομείου που ανταλλάχθηκαν μεταξύ του Albayrak και του Betul Yilmaz, του διευθυντή ανθρωπίνων πόρων της Çalık Holding, ενός ομίλου στον οποίο ο Albayrak ήταν διευθύνων σύμβουλος. Ο Yilmaz επιδιώκει την έγκριση από την Albayrak όσον αφορά τις αποφάσεις του προσωπικού της Powertrans, όπως ποιος να προσλάβει , και την έγκριση των μισθών της Powertrans .
Το αρχείο παρουσιάζει επίσης προσπάθειες ελέγχου του τουρκικού Τύπου και των κοινωνικών μέσων ενημέρωσης υπέρ του κυβερνώντος κόμματος του AKP.
Το 2013, όταν ξεκίνησαν μεγάλες διαδηλώσεις εναντίον του Ερντογάν, ορισμένοι αξιωματούχοι του ΑΚΡ ανησυχούσαν για τον αυξανόμενο ρόλο των κοινωνικών μέσων ενημέρωσης στις διαμαρτυρίες. Ορισμένα μηνύματα ηλεκτρονικού ταχυδρομείου δείχνουν ότι από τις διαμαρτυρίες του Gezi Park του 2013 το AKP έχει επενδύσει στον έλεγχο των κοινωνικών μέσων μαζικής ενημέρωσης, συμπεριλαμβανομένης της πρόσληψης ατόμων για να εργαστούν στο Twitter για να επηρεάσουν την ανταλλαγή μηνυμάτων στην πλατφόρμα, παρά τον αποκλεισμό της κανονικής πρόσβασης στο διαδίκτυο για όσους βρίσκονται στην Τουρκία. Το 2013, η Wall Street Journal ισχυρίστηκε επίσης ότι η κυβέρνηση είχε διαμορφώσει μια ομάδα κοινωνικών μέσων 6.000 ατόμων
Τα μηνύματα ηλεκτρονικού ταχυδρομείου δείχνουν ότι το AKP δημιούργησε δύο ομάδες για να εισαγάγει τη δική του προπαγάνδα σε πλατφόρμες κοινωνικών μέσων. Η πρόταση για μια ομάδα αποτελείται από κωδικοποιητές, γραφίστες, σεναριογράφους και δύο ειδικούς στον ψυχολογικό πόλεμο . Μια μεγαλύτερη ομάδα αποτελείται από λογαριασμούς Twitter που λαμβάνουν και διαδίδουν μηνύματα pro-Erdoğan στα κοινωνικά μέσα ενημέρωσης . Στις 28 Ιουνίου 2013, η ομάδα ξεκίνησε μία από τις πρώτες προγραμματισμένες εκστρατείες των hashtag, "# DirenÇözüm", χρησιμοποιώντας τη λέξη-κλειδί "διαδηλωτές" των διαδηλωτών, υποδεικνύοντας επίσης ότι η κυβέρνηση επιθυμεί μια ειρηνική λύση. Σε αυτό το μήνυμα ηλεκτρονικού ταχυδρομείου, η ομάδα στέλνει το hashtag και έξι πιθανά μηνύματα για τους trolls του AKP για χρήση .
According to an 11 January 2016 email, Albayrak was lobbying to keep the third most popular media group in Turkey, Ipek, either under the control of the government or to be sold to a business group close to the government, instead of being returned to its rightful owners . The Ipek Group had been seized by police in October 2015.
The email archive details the Turkish government's crackdown on the media, and shows how serious the situation in Turkey really is.
Last year the situation deteriorated further when Turkish police commandos uploaded videos of themselves killing people and destroying homes onto social media during the Turkish government's relaunch of armed confrontations against the Kurds. Many Turkish media outlets, already powerless to report on this brazen illegality, became particularly vulnerable just before the November 2015 elections after the break-up of the coalition of the AKP and the Gülen movement, when the government proceeded to forcefully take over Gülen-aligned media.
With this came the new strategy of seizing critical media by force and assigning control to a government-appointed "trustee". In 2016, especially after the failed coup, police raided nearly every media holding. Özgür Gündem, which is the most widely read newspaper of the Kurdish freedom movement, was raided and shut down on 16 August. Aslı Erdoğan, who served as an advisory board member and columnist, was arrested immediately afterwards on 19 August. People who showed solidarity against the media crackdown were jailed too, including Necmiye Alpay, a renowned linguist and writer, on charges of “being a member of an armed terrorist organisation” (PKK) and “subverting the unity and integrity of the State”.
IMC TV, the most watched TV channel in northern Kurdistan, had its uplink in Istanbul turned off by the police on 4 October 2016. Dozens of TV and radio stations have been shut down in Turkey over the past few months, including a Kurdish-language cartoon channel for children, on grounds of supposed links to terrorist organisations such FETO (Gülen) or the PKK (Kurds). One of the most recent blows was against the Cumhuriyet newspaper, one of the oldest in Turkey with links to Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP), Turkey’s main opposition party, which had all its prominent writers arrested on 31 October. As a result, at present there is almost no critical media left in Turkey. Social media, which might otherwise fill the void, is heavily censored or flooded with AKP-aligned trolls and bots.
WikiLeaks has also been at the receiving end of the AKP government's censorship push. In August this year, following the failed coup, WikiLeaks published the ruling AKP party's email database, after which the government issued a decree the same day blocking Turks from accessing the wikileaks.org site. WikiLeaks remains banned to this day. A propaganda effort was subsequently launched to falsely claim that WikiLeaks had published the records of “millions of Turkish women”, which was then widely disseminated by western liberal press eager to distract from WikiLeaks’ exposures of Hillary Clinton.
The attack on critical media was followed by a crackdown on opposition MPs. In a midnight operation on 4 November, Turkish police arrested 11 MPs of the Kurdish political party HDP, including the party's co-chairs Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ.
The Redhack leak was briefly publicised and led to the resignation of Mehmet Ali Yalçındağ, who was one of the head executives of the biggest media conglomerate in Turkey Doğan Medya, due to the documented collaboration between him and Berat Albayrak . However, after the emails largely disappeared from the internet and the escalation of the Turkish government crackdown on the media, the emails had been effectively suppressed.
WikiLeaks’ publication of the archive today ensures the safekeeping of this historical record and the public's proper access by making it readily searchable and citable.
WikiLeaks’ editor Julian Assange said: "The people of Turkey need a free media and a free internet. The government's counter-coup efforts have gone well beyond their stated purpose of protecting the State from a second Gulenist coup attempt and are now primarily used to steal assets and eliminate critics. The Turkish government continues to use force to jail journalists, shut down media and restrict internet access to its citizens, depriving them of their ability to access information about their situation including by banning WikiLeaks. This consolidation around the power vertical of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan ultimately weakens Turkish institutionalism, leaving Turkey more susceptible to future coups by those in Erdoğan's chain of command."
font redaction https://wikileaks.org/berats-box/article
Fethullah Gulen
A US-based Turkish cleric accused of plotting a coup to overthrow the Ankara government has claimed President Recep Erdogan staged
the rebellion himself to justify a major clampdown on opposition forces.
Corrupt, egomaniacal and repressive, there is not much to recommend Turkish President Tayyip Erdoğan’s rule – save the inescapable fact that he is the democratically elected head of state. And that he is a politician who shines brightest in a fight.
Erdoğan is not going to give up. He has millions of supporters who will give their lives for him. He has the support of all the opposition parties. And, because he’s won three elections – he is in the right.
Friday night, the streets of Istanbul were filled with people. Mosques in Turkey had been calling the people into the street. Erdoğan was giving the same message on national television – through a FaceTime linkup. One man shouts back, “I am a Kurd from Bingöl and I will die.” Early Saturday morning, Erdoğan again appears on television, now surrounded by supporters at the Istanbul airport. There are continued reports of jets buzzing Ankara and Istanbul.
Turkey’s military has long felt a sense of ownership of the country. Its first leaders, Kemal Atatürk and İsmet İnönü, were former generals. After democratic elections in 1950, Turkey experienced three military coups - in 1960, 1971, and 1980. Each was bloodier and more repressive than the last.
In 1997, the military staged what has been called a “post-modern coup,” and sent then-Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan packing with a memo. There was nothing “post-modern” about the coup attempt that shook Turkey Friday night. Military units were in the streets, main arteries were shut down.
The ruling Justice and Development Party, or AKP, a center-right party with roots in political Islam, has dominated Turkish politics since 2002. It only came to power by facing off with the military. In 2007, generals attempted to repeat their 1997 success with a “midnight memorandum,” which condemned the candidacy of AKP politician Abdullah Gül, a close ally of Erdoğan, as the next president of the republic.
Erdoğan, however, faced the generals down, and Gül took his place in the presidential palace until Erdogan was elected to the post seven years later.
Erdoğan quickly reconfigured the largely ceremonial post into a powerful job. At one point, AKP leadership played an important role and could challenge Erdoğan on policy issues. No longer. Ministers serve at the president’s pleasure. Policy is determined in a new and grandiose presidential palace. Erdoğan has made clear that his ambition is to change the constitution to create a presidential system that would render into law what is already political reality.
For years, Erdoğan has waged war against the military: Hundreds of officers were targeted under trumped-up charges, others were forced into retirement. Meanwhile, the police and intelligence services were strengthened to act as a counter-weight to the military.
In the past two years, however, it seemed that Erdoğan and the military had come to terms. Certainly, they united in waging their no-holds-barred war on the resurgent Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). The fighting has displaced hundreds of thousands of Kurds. It has leveled whole neighborhoods, with no end in sight.
It was clear, however, that many officers were unhappy with Erdoğan. They were resentful of the abuse their comrades had faced in the show trials. Many believed that the violence of the conflict with the PKK was a result, in part, of the AKP’s earlier negotiations with the group.
At some military funerals, officers often specifically blamed Erdoğan for the soldiers’ deaths. They reasonably viewed the rise of jihadi violence in Turkey as the cost of the AKP’s tolerance of jihadi groups in the Syrian civil war. Like many secularists, they feared a creeping dismantling of Turkey’s secularism.
The press has largely been cowed; judicial independence mostly broken. Perhaps some in the military believed that this was their last chance to halt Erdoğan’s consolidation of power.
A successful coup would likely be a disaster. The result could be a civil war. The Obama administration was slow off the mark in condemning the coup attempt, but it is a positive sign that it finally did so.
The coup apparently isn’t entirely over yet. But it seems already broken. Major generals have condemned it and many soldiers have returned to their barracks. If a successful coup would have led to chaos, a failed coup would likely result in even greater repression and centralization of power.
Friday night’s events will likely solidify Erdoğan’s worst tendencies. Moreover, by apparently facing down the coup, Erdoğan has effectively burnished his own brand as a man of the people.
On social media, conspiracy theories suggest that the “coup” was staged theater, orchestrated so that Erdoğan could gain more support and take greater control. This seems nonsense. But the essential point is correct: If Erdoğan has prevailed he has been made far stronger.
(Howard Eissenstat, επίκουρος καθηγητής ιστορίας στο Πανεπιστήμιο St. Lawrence, είναι ειδικός στην Τουρκία και την επιρροή της στην περιοχή.
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Τα σύνταξη http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-primeminister-comment-idUSKCN0ZW092?utm_campaign=trueAnthem:+Trending+Content&utm_content=5789eaad04d3014272a19b97&utm_medium=trueAnthem&utm_source=facebook
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